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Abstract
Preparing for and responding to outbreaks of serious livestock infectious diseases are criti-
cal measures to safeguard animal health, public health, and food supply. Almost all of the
current control strategies are empirical, and mass culling or “stamping out” is frequently
the principal strategy for controlling epidemics. However, there are ethical, ecological, and
economic reasons to consider less drastic control strategies. Here we use modeling to
quantitatively study the efficacy of different control measures for viral outbreaks, where the
infectiousness, transmissibility and death rate of animals commonly depends on their viral
load. We develop a broad theoretical framework for exploring and understanding this het-
erogeneity. The model includes both direct transmission from infectious animals and indirect
transmission from an environmental reservoir. We then incorporate a large variety of control
measures, including vaccination, antivirals, isolation, environmental disinfection, and sev-
eral forms of culling, which may result in fewer culled animals. We provide explicit formulae
for the basic reproduction number, R0, for each intervention and for combinations. We evalu-
ate the control methods for a realistic simulated outbreak of low pathogenic avian influenza
on a mid-sized turkey farm. In this simulated outbreak, culling results in more total dead
birds and dramatically more when culling all of the infected birds.
Introduction
Zoonotic infections are estimated to cause more than two million human deaths every year
[1]. Of particular concern are infections affecting livestock, because of close human interac-
tion, zoonotic potential, and economic impact. Preparing for and responding to serious live-
stock epidemics are critical to safeguarding public health, animal health, and food supply.
Viral diseases in livestock with high economic and social impact, such as highly pathogenic
avian influenza (HPAI), classical swine fever, African swine fever, and foot-and-mouth disease
(FMD), require efficient control measures to prevent continued spread. No curative treatment
exists for these diseases; eradications of local outbreaks are frequently based on mass culling
combined with movement restrictions. These control measures are often implemented
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empirically, though it has long been argued that modeling should be more extensively used as
a tool in veterinary epidemiology [2].
Mass culling (or “stamping out”) is the euthanasia of infected animals and all susceptible
animals that have potentially been exposed to the virus on an infected premise, and in rare
cases on other premises considered at risk. However, there are ethical, ecological, and eco-
nomic reasons to consider less drastic control strategies. Animal welfare in disease outbreaks
is receiving considerable attention as mass cullings have raised concerns over humane options
for effected animals [3, 4]. Additionally, although mass culling may provide a useful short-
term benefit, there could be serious evolutionary repercussions on reservoir hosts and the viral
population. For instance, mass culling may impede the evolution of host resistance and select
for heightened virulence and transmissibility [5].
During the 2001 outbreak of FMD in Britain, the government slaughtered nearly 6.5 million
sheep, cattle, and pigs [6]. Not only were all the animals on infected farms culled, but also all
animals on adjacent farms, regardless of whether infection had been reported there. Although
there were a few models to support these actions, some veterinarians thought such mass
depopulation was unnecessary (see [7] for an overview). They believed a more targeted
approach would have been sufficient to end the outbreak, but they lacked models to assess
alternative strategies. The model presented in [8] attempts to manage real-time outbreaks of
FMD. One subsequent modeling study indicated that the outbreak could have been controlled
by culling only animals known to be infected along with early detection of the outbreak [9].
In 2005, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and World Organization
for Animal Health announced that vaccination and segregation should replace mass culling
during outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza in developing countries [10]. This shift
was driven by the realization that H5N1 is widespread in wild and domestic bird populations,
and since bio-containment from wild birds would be prohibitively expensive, regardless of
how often affected poultry flocks are culled, the virus is likely to reappear. Also, avian influenza
mutates rapidly. Complete depopulation removes valuable food and economic resources from
animals who must consume or sell their own birds for survival. These suggestions appear to be
strictly empirical and not based on any modeling studies. In this work we develop modeling
tools to investigate these alternative control methods.
Infectiousness, transmissibility, and death rate depends on viral load [11–15]. Recent exper-
iments with chickens have begun to quantify this dependence for avian influenza [16]. We
develop and analyze a viral titer structured transmission model that extends previous work
(e.g. [17, 18], which were motivated by HIV transmission) in several important ways: (1) Our
model allows for both direct transmission from infectious animals and indirect transmission
from an environmental reservoir, which according to veterinarians, is frequently an essential
mode of transmission. (2) We allow recovery from the disease. (3) We include a latent infec-
tion class, and (4) We incorporate a large variety of control measures, including antivirals, vac-
cination, isolation, environmental disinfection, and several forms of culling, which may result
in fewer dead animals. We provide explicit formulae for the basic reproduction number, R0,
for each intervention and for combinations.
We simulate a realistic outbreak of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) on a mid-sized
commercial turkey farm and evaluate the efficacy of the control methods.
Basic model description
Many previous investigators have employed structured compartment transmission models,
e.g., age-structured models, spatially structured models, contact risk structured, immunization
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status structured, but this appears to be one of the first viral titer structured transmission mod-
els. We recommend [11] for a general introduction to compartment transmission models.
We first construct a viral titer structured compartment transmission model, without
interventions (see Fig 1 for a model schematic with three infected classes). We assume fre-
quency dependent transmission by direct contact and indirect transmission via contact with
an environmental reservoir. We make the simplifying assumption that there is a single sus-
ceptible species and a single strain of virus. We divide the population into susceptible S,
exposed E, infectious I, and removed R animals. Including an exposed class allows an explicit
consideration of the disease latency period. The removed class includes animals that are not
susceptible and not infected. In latter sections, the removed class also contains vaccinated
and isolated animals. Each infected animal sheds virus into the environment at a rate
depending on its viral load. Since a virus requires a host to multiply, we assume no growth of
viruses in the environment and, furthermore, that viruses in the environment lose their
infectiousness over time.
We additionally split the infected animals into distinct subgroups based on their viral load;
the differences in viral load result in each subgroup having their own transmission and death
rates. Each infected animal progresses through the infected classes as their viral load increases.
As their viral load decreases, the animal progresses down the chain of infected classes to the
removed class. For each animal the viral load increases to some maximum level, which may be
different per animal, though there is an absolute maximum level that no animal may surpass.
More precisely, we decompose the range of all possible viral titer levels into n subintervals.
The animals with viral load in the jth subinterval are in infected class Ij. In the model we distin-
guish between those animals who are entering the Ij class for the first time, IjA, and those who
are recovering, IjB. Referencing the notation in the model schematic, Fig 1, some animals will
enter I1A before recovering, while others will progress from I1A to I2A to I1B before recovering,
and so on. For the infected classes, we let κab be the transfer rate from class Ia to neighboring
class Ib, which corresponds to an increase or decrease in the viral titer load.
Fig 1. Basic viral titer compartment transmission model schematic with three infection classes. The rates of transfer
between the classes are indicated, where I1 = I1A + I1B and I2 = I2A + I2B.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0171199.g001
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Susceptible animals become infected through contact with animals in any infected class and
through contact with virus in the environment. Susceptible animals who are infected move
into the exposed class and become infectious at a rate α, moving into infectious class I1A. We
assume that the transmission rate between animals depends on the viral load of the infecting
animal; βj is the rate of new infections generated by animals in class Ij. We assume that the
transmission rate is higher with a higher viral load, so that βi< βi+1 for 1 i< n. The rate that
animals become infected through contacts with the environment is determined by function
λ(V). Two frequently used functions for λ(V) are the linear function λV and the Hill function
λV/(K + V), where K is a positive constant.
Animals in infectious class Ij shed virus into the environment V, at rate ej. Virus in the envi-
ronment lose infectiousness at rate δV.
Infected animals in the first infected class, with the lowest viral load, recover at a prescribed
rate κ10. We assume that the viral load is zero for animals in the susceptible and removed clas-
ses. Animals in the exposed class cannot infect others and do not shed virus into the environ-
ment. Recovery provides permanent immunity. Mortality for infected animals is included,
with rates δj depending on the level of infection. Because we are modeling short-term out-
breaks, we assume no natural births or deaths.
We do not include any immigration or emigration of animals into or from the population
during the outbreak. Thus for domestic livestock populations there is no import or export of
animals during the outbreak. The model assumes that the population mixes homogeneously.
This is a reasonable assumptions for animals allowed to freely roam for some time each day
such as free roaming broilers (chickens raised for their meat).
The viral titer structured compartment transmission model is given by the following system
of ordinary differential equations.
dS
dt
¼   lðVÞS  
Xn
i¼1
bi
N   D
IiS
dE
dt
¼ lðVÞSþ
Xn
i¼1
bi
N   D
IiS   aE
dI1A
dt
¼ aE   k12I1A   k10I1A   d1I1A
dIjA
dt
¼ kðj  1ÞjIðj  1ÞA   kjðjþ1ÞIjA   kjðj  1ÞIjA   djIjA
dIn
dt
¼ kðn  1ÞnIðn  1ÞA   knðn  1ÞIn   dnIn
dIjB
dt
¼ kðjþ1Þj Iðjþ1ÞA þ Iðjþ1ÞB
 
  kjðj  1ÞIjB   djIjB
dI1B
dt
¼ k21ðI2A þ I2BÞ   k10I1B   d1I1B
dR
dt
¼ k10ðI1A þ I1BÞ
dD
dt
¼
Xn
i¼1
diIi
dV
dt
¼
Xn
i¼1
eiIi   dVV
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with initial conditions
Sð0Þ ¼ N   I0; I1Að0Þ ¼ I0; I1Bð0Þ ¼ 0;
Eð0Þ ¼ 0; Ijð0Þ ¼ 0; Rð0Þ ¼ 0; Dð0Þ ¼ 0; Vð0Þ ¼ 0;
for 1< j< n, for total population of size N. All model parameters are positive (Table 1).
Summing the left-hand sides of the differential equations for the number of animals gives
the rate of change of the entire population and summing the right-hand sides gives 0. There-
fore, the population size N is fixed, meaning,
N ¼ SðtÞ þ EðtÞ þ
Xn
k¼1
IkðtÞ þ RðtÞ þ DðtÞ;
for all t 0. Note that we include animals who die from infection D in the total population
size.
To be most general, for the environmental infection rate λ(V) we require
• λ(0) = 0,
• λ(V) 0 when V> 0,
• λ(V) is differentiable at V = 0, and
• λ(V) λ0(0)V.
The first two conditions ensure that infection is possible from the environment only when
there is virus present. The derivative of the infection rate appears in the expression for the
basic reproduction number. The final technical condition is required to prove the global stabil-
ity of the equilibrium point. (Refer to The Analysis of the Basic Model for details on the later
two conditions.) The linear function λ(V) = λV, the Hill function λ(V) = λV/(K + V), and the
function λ(V) = ρ(1 − e−φV) satisfy all conditions.
The analysis of the basic model
It is easily seen that the only equilibrium points are the disease-free equilibrium points and
they form a one-parameter family of equilibrium points
ðS;E; I1A; . . . ; In; . . . ; I1B;R;D;VÞ ¼ ðS
; 0; . . . ; 0;R;D; 0Þ;
with 0 S + R + D  N. Given a particular initial condition, the equilibrium point corre-
sponding to a particular initial condition depends on the choice of model parameters.
Table 1. Basic viral titer compartment transmission model parameters.
βi transmission rate for Ii
α latency to infectious rate
κab viral titer class change rate from Ia to Ib
δi, δV death rate for Ii, V
κ10 recovery rate
ei virus shedding rate for Ii
λ(V) environmental transmission rate function
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0171199.t001
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The model structure implies that each of S, E, Ii, R, and D will be between 0 and N, and V
will be between 0 and some maximum value depending on the size of the infected classes Ii,
and the parameters ei and δV.
The basic reproduction number, R0. The basic reproduction number is the number of
secondary infections caused by each primary infection at the onset of the outbreak. When the
basic reproduction number is less than one, then the outbreak will be driven to extinction. On
the other hand, if the number is larger than one, the disease will begin to spread at an exponen-
tial rate. Our disease outbreak control strategies entail making interventions such that the
resulting basic reproduction number is less than one.
Using the next generation operator method [19, 20], we compute the basic reproduction
number for the general model with n infected classes.
Theorem 1. For any number n of infected classes, the reproduction number is
R0 ¼ S0
Xn
i¼1
Bi þ eiLð ÞK01 . . .Kði  1Þi 1þ
Xn  i
j¼1
Yjþi  1
l¼i
Klðlþ1ÞKðlþ1Þl
 !
; ð1Þ
where when i = n the final sum (from j = 1 to j = 0) is set to 0 and
Bi ¼
bi
S0 þ R0
; L ¼
l
0
ð0Þ
dV
; K01 ¼
1
d1 þ k10 þ k12
;
Kði  1Þi ¼
kði  1Þi
di þ kiði  1Þ þ kiðiþ1Þ
; Kðn  1Þn ¼
kðn  1Þn
dn þ knðn  1Þ
;
and Kðiþ1Þi ¼
kðiþ1Þi
di þ kiði  1Þ
;
for 1 i< n.
As an example, for the model with three infected classes (Fig 1), the basic reproduction
number is
R0 ¼ S0 ððB1 þ e1LÞK01ð1þK12K21 þK12K23K32K21Þ
þðB2 þ e2LÞK01K12ð1þK23K32Þ
þðB3 þ e3LÞK01K12K23Þ:
Proof (Theorem 1). The infection system can be decomposed into new infections and all
other movement out of and between infection classes. In particular for n = 3,
E
I1A
I2A
I3
I2B
I1B
V
2
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
3
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
5
0
¼
lðVÞSþ
Pn
i¼1
bi
N   D
IiS
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
3
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
5
 
aE
  aE þ ðk12 þ k10 þ d1ÞI1A
  k12I1A þ ðk21 þ k23 þ d2ÞI2A
  k23I2A þ ðk32 þ d3ÞI3
  k32I3 þ ðk21 þ d2ÞI2B
  k21ðI2A þ I2BÞ þ ðk10 þ d1ÞI1B
  e1I1   e2I2   e3I3 þ dVV
2
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
3
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
5
; ð2Þ
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Compute the Jacobian matrix for each of the vectors of the right-hand side. We have
F ¼
0
b1
Sþ R
S
b2
Sþ R
S
b3
Sþ R
S
b2
Sþ R
S
b1
Sþ R
S l0ðVÞS
0 0 . . . . . . 0
..
. ..
.
0 0 . . . . . . 0
2
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
3
7
7
7
7
7
7
5
and
V ¼
a 0 0 0 0 0 0
  a k12 þ k10 þ d1 0 0 0 0 0
0   k12 k21 þ k23 þ d2 0 0 0 0
0 0   k23 k32 þ d3 0 0 0
0 0 0   k32 k21 þ d2 0 0
0 0   k21 0   k21 k10 þ d1 0
0   e1   e2   e3   e2   e1 dV
2
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
3
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
5
:
The theory of the next generation matrix method allows one to compute the basic repro-
duction number as the largest positive eigenvalue of the product FV   1. The product has the
form
FV   1 ¼
R ? ? ? ? ?
0 . . . . . . 0
..
. ..
.
0 . . . . . . 0
2
6
6
6
6
6
4
3
7
7
7
7
7
5
;
each ? is some positive expression of the model parameters. The six eigenvalues of this matrix
are R, 0, 0, 0, 0, and 0, and the basic reproduction number is R given by Eq (1).
Global stability. We construct a global Lyapunov function implying that the disease free
equilibrium point
ðS;E; I1; . . . ; In;R;D;VÞ ¼ ðS
; 0; . . . ; 0;R;D; 0Þ;
is globally asymptotically attracting when R0 < 1. (See [17] for similar argument.)
Theorem 2. If R0 < 1, any equilibrium point with S > 0 is globally asymptotically stable.
Thus the total number of exposed and infected individuals will diminish to 0, as will the number
of virus particles in the environment.
Proof. For notational convenience, we reindex the infected classes as
I1A ¼ I1; . . . ; In ¼ In; Iðn  1ÞB ¼ Inþ1; . . . ; I1B ¼ I2n  1:
Controlling viral outbreaks: Quantitative strategies
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The infection system (2) can be written in the form (with n = 3)
E
I1A
I2A
I3
I2B
I1B
V
2
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
3
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
5
0
¼
E
I1
I2
I3
I4
I5
V
2
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
3
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
5
0
¼
lðVÞSþ
P2n  1
i¼1
bi
N   D
IiS
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
3
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
5
  V
E
I1A
I2A
I3
I2B
I1B
V
2
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
3
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
5
; ð3Þ
Define vector
c ¼ ðc0; c1; . . . ; cn; . . . ; c2n  1; c2nÞ
¼ 0;B1; . . . ;Bn; . . . ;B1; l
0
ð0Þð ÞV   1
and note that c0 ¼
R0
S0
.
Consider the function L ¼ c0E þ
X2n  1
i¼1
ckIk þ c2nV , the dot product of the vector c and the
vector of infections [E, I1, . . ., I2n−1, V]. Taking the derivative of L and evaluating along a solu-
tion S(t) yields
L0 ¼ c0E0 þ
X2n  1
i¼1
ciI
0
i þ c2nV
0
¼ c0 lðVÞSþ
X2n  1
i¼1
biIiS
 !
 
X2n  1
i¼1
BiIi   l
0
ð0ÞV
 ðc0S0   1Þ
X2n  1
i¼1
BiIi þ l
0
ð0ÞV
 !
¼ ðR0   1Þ
X2n  1
i¼1
BiIi þ l
0
ð0ÞV
 !
:
The inequality holds because of the fourth technical condition placed on λ(V) and since along
solution trajectories the number of susceptible animals decreases from S(0) to S.
Mitigation strategies and recommendations
We consider various control strategies and incorporate each into the basic transmission model
and calculate the resulting R0. We provide recommendations to force the basic reproduction
number less than one.
Vaccination
Vaccination can be used to prevent infection before an outbreak or to reduce the susceptible
pool during an outbreak. Many farm animals, even in developing countries, are routinely vac-
cinated against endemic diseases such as Newcastle disease in poultry and Q fever in goats
[21]. Emergency vaccinations are used during some outbreaks, however, some countries may
not import animals given an emergency vaccination [22]. Also, emergency vaccinations
Controlling viral outbreaks: Quantitative strategies
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require quick access to large quantities of strain-specific vaccines, which may be cost or time
prohibitive.
Ideally, vaccination prevents a susceptible animals from ever being infected. However, few
vaccines prevent infection entirely. Highly effective livestock vaccines typically reduce the like-
lihood and severity of clinical disease expression and reduce the amount of viral shedding. For
the purposes of modeling, we assume vaccinated animals are moved from the susceptible to
the removed class. Assuming that fraction f of the population is vaccinated at random and the
vaccine has efficacy e, then fraction fv = ef of the population is protected by the vaccination and
the basic reproduction number is
ð1   fvÞR0;
where R0 is the basic reproduction number for the base model (Eq (1)). Thus, to end the out-
break, a fraction f of the population is given the vaccine, where f is larger than
1  
1
R0
 
1
e
:
For a perfectly effective vaccine (e = 1), this is the well-known herd immunity threshold [11].
Isolation
Isolation separates known infected animals from those not yet known to be infected. The
rapid removal of sick and dead animals has long been a mainstay strategy to control out-
breaks in livestock populations. For example, to control Pullorum disease, which was essen-
tially eradicated many years ago in commercial flocks, a rapid blood test was used and
reactors were immediately removed from the flock [23]. A similar approach has been used to
control bovine brucellosis and tuberculosis, and equine infectious anemia [21]. However for
large outbreaks, the logistics of isolation are frequently difficult to achieve in both human
and animal populations.
Isolated animals are moved from their current infection class to the removed class. Animals
can be moved all at once (rapid) or over time (gradual).
Targeted rapid isolation. Targeted rapid isolation involves testing the animals and isolat-
ing those that are currently in some number of the most infectious classes. One can affect this
in two ways: isolating all animals in the highest infected classes or isolating only a fraction of
those animals. We call the first complete and the second partial targeted rapid isolation. We
note that the same fraction need not be removed from each class. Assuming that visibly sick
animals are those with the highest viral loads and therefore in the most infectious classes, one
may think of targeted rapid isolation as isolating all the animals assessed as having the most
severe clinical signs.
Neither isolation strategy effects the value of the basic reproduction number since R0 does
not depend on the number of animals in the infected classes and the population size N is fixed
(see Eq (1)). While targeted isolation does not reduce R0, the dynamics of the outbreak will
change. When the number of infected animals is smaller, the number of susceptible animals
will decrease more slowly, perhaps allowing time for other interventions to be used. To see this
multiply the size of the highest infected classes in the dS/dt equation by 1 − fc. Certainly we
Controlling viral outbreaks: Quantitative strategies
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must have that
0 >   lðVÞS  
Xj  1
k¼1
bkIkS  
Xn
k¼j
bkIkð1   fcÞS >   lðVÞS  
Xn
k¼1
bkIkS:
A similar argument will hold if the fraction removed from each class is different.
Targeted gradual isolation. For targeted gradual (continuous) isolation, only animals in
the highest infection classes are isolated. In the R0 formula replace δi by δi + fc only for those
classes that are isolated. For example, isolating from only the top class, In, in the R0 formula,
we have
Kðn  1Þn ¼
kðn  1Þn
dn þ fc þ knðn  1Þ
:
Environmental disinfection
Disinfection of surfaces to prevent transmission by contact is one of the cornerstones of dis-
ease transmission prevention. Many animal diseases are known to transmit via contact with
virus particles present in the environment, such as FMD [24], equine infectious diseases [25],
classic swine fever [21], and avian influenza [26]. For animals, environmental disinfection con-
sists of disinfection of infected housing, equipment, vehicles, manure, or the removal of dead
animals. Additionally, the guidelines recommended by the FAO & OIE and others to reduce
the mass culling of infected poultry include careful disposal of infected animals and their prod-
ucts, as well as careful disinfection of the habitats of the infected animals (see for example
[10]).
There are several ways to effect environmental disinfection, including one-time and contin-
uous. These are similar to the isolation strategies of rapid and gradual, respectively.
One-time environmental disinfection. A one-time environmental disinfection rapidly
reduces the pathogens present in the environment. The environment could be completely
cleaned (V = 0) or only partially cleaned. In either case, environmental disinfection does not
effect the value of the basic reproduction number R0, since R0 does not depend on the specific
number of pathogens in the environment. However, the dynamics of the outbreak will change
when the environment is disinfected, the number of susceptible animals will decrease more
slowly. This follows from a similar argument as for targeted rapid isolation.
Continuous environmental disinfection. In the basic formula for R0, the term δV repre-
sents the rate at which the virus naturally degrades outside of a host, i.e. loses its infectivity. To
account for the continual disinfection of the habitat, replace δV with a higher value represent-
ing the natural virus degradation plus the effect of the environmental disinfection, δV + b. As a
result, in the R0 formula, the term in the formula for R0 coming from environmental infections
becomes
L ¼
l
0
ð0Þ
dV þ b
:
Culling
Complete depopulation is the current method for control of many livestock viral diseases.
However, there are several culling strategies that may result in fewer dead animals. These
include culling only the animals assessed as having the most severe clinical signs, culling a frac-
tion of randomly selected animals, or culling over a longer time scale (gradual). Some authors
Controlling viral outbreaks: Quantitative strategies
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argue that culling over a longer time scale is likely to lead to increased rather than decreased
animal health and welfare impacts [27]. Drawbacks to incomplete culling include continued
disease presence, and economic issues, such as other countries being unwilling to import ani-
mals from places with recent outbreaks.
Untargeted rapid culling. One depopulation method is to randomly cull a fraction fc of
animals from the entire population at one time. Both susceptible and infected animals will
be culled, a seemingly nonintuitive strategy. In this case, the resulting basic reproduction num-
ber is
ð1   fcÞR0;
where R0 is the basic reproduction number for the basic model (Eq (1)), because the initial
number of susceptible animals changes from S0 to S0(1 − fc). Thus, if a fraction fc of the animals
are culled larger than
1  
1
R0
;
then the outbreak will rapidly end. The above threshold is equal to the well-known herd
immunity threshold for vaccination [11] and has a similar interpretation here.
Untargeted gradual culling. Gradual culling is the continuous culling of a small to mod-
erate fraction of animals over a long time period, instead of a one-time rapid depopulation.
Each day fraction fc of the population is culled at random, which in the model equations is an
additional disease related death that affects all classes, including S and R. Therefore, in the sys-
tem of differential equations and the corresponding basic reproduction number each δi term is
replaced with δi + fc. In the R0 formula, we have
K01 ¼
1
d1 þ fc þ k10 þ k12
; Kði  1Þi ¼
kði  1Þi
di þ fc þ kiði  1Þ þ kiðiþ1Þ
;
Kðn  1Þn ¼
kðn  1Þn
dn þ fc þ knðn  1Þ
; and Kðiþ1Þi ¼
kðiþ1Þi
di þ fc þ kiði  1Þ
;
for 1 i< n.
Targeted rapid culling. Targeted rapid culling involves testing the animals and culling
those animals that are currently in some number of the most infectious classes. Unlike untar-
geted culling, no susceptible animals are culled. The effect of targeted rapid culling is exactly as
the effect of targeted rapid isolation.
Targeted gradual culling. For targeted gradual (continuous) culling, only animals in the
highest infection classes are culled. The effect of targeted gradual culling is exactly as the effect
of targeted gradual isolation.
Antivirals
Antiviral drugs disrupt the life cycle of the virus, reducing or halting its spread. Although there
is a large arsenal of antivirals licensed for human use, at present, only one antiviral drug has
been licensed for use in veterinary medicine, feline interferon-omega [28]. Regardless, several
of the antivirals licensed for human use have been used for animal diseases. However, the
extensive use of antiviral agents against the infection in swine and poultry could promote the
emergence of resistant strains and impair the use of these drugs in humans. For this reason,
the use of antivirals in animals is discouraged, e.g., since 2006 the FDA has prohibited the
use of antivirals in poultry in the United States [29] (and see Code of Federal Regulations
21CFR530.41).
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The use of antiviral drugs results in animals moving from an infected class with higher viral
load to classes with lower load more quickly. Assuming all infected animals receive the antivi-
ral at the same time, then the rate of transfer from a more infected class to a less infected class
increases by rate a. Therefore, each κ(i+1)i term in the system of differential equations and the
basic reproduction number becomes κ(i+1)i + a. If only p% of the animals in each class are
given the antiviral, then κ(i+1)i is replaced with κ(i+1)i + ap. In the R0 formula (Eq (1)), we have
Kði  1Þi ¼
kði  1Þi
di þ kiði  1Þ þ apþ kiðiþ1Þ
;
Kðn  1Þn ¼
kðn  1Þn
dn þ knðn  1Þ þ ap
; and Kðiþ1Þi ¼
kðiþ1Þi þ ap
di þ kiði  1Þ þ ap
;
for 1 i< n.
Combined methods of control
In the past, combinations of methods have been employed to control outbreaks, such as vacci-
nation and antivirals to control outbreaks of influenza in chickens [30]. The basic reproduc-
tion number for combinations of control methods are the combinations of modifications as
described above. For example, using both vaccination and antivirals has a basic reproduction
number of
ð1   fvÞR0a;
where R0a is the basic reproduction number when using antivirals. Similarly, using both untar-
geted rapid culling and vaccination has a basic reproduction number of
ð1   fcÞð1   fvÞR0:
Other combined basic reproduction numbers are computed similarly.
Model simulation: Low Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (LPAI) outbreak in
a turkey farm
A main novelty of the model developed here is the multiple infected classes defined by viral
titer. We use the data presented of a highly controlled transmission study of LPAI in turkeys
[31] to estimate model parameter values to simulate an outbreak of LPAI in a turkey farm con-
taining 10,000 birds. We estimate the remaining parameters using values from the literature
[32–34]. See Table 2. We use our model with two infectious classes (with no latent period) and
an environmental reservoir to capture the heterogeneity of viral titre load and transmission
routes. The environmental transmission function is λ(V) = ρ(1 − e−φV) [34]. The value of ρ was
selected so that none (ρ = 0), one-quarter (ρ = 0.06), half (ρ = 0.2), three-quarters (ρ = 0.6), or
all (ρ = 10,000) of the transmission occurs due to the environment (Table 3).
We simulate various control measures, including all types of culling and environmental dis-
infection. No control measure appreciably decreases the total number of dead birds, and in
many cases, culling substantially increases the number of dead birds (Tables 4 and 5). Even
with thorough environmental disinfection, the environment quickly becomes recontaminated,
preventing almost no infections.
Discussion
We construct a virus titer structured compartment transmission model allowing for different
transmission and death rates for animals with different viral loads. The model includes both
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direct and indirect transmission through contacts with infectious animals and the environ-
mental reservoir, respectively. We then use this model to investigate control strategies to end
disease outbreaks. These include vaccinations, isolation, environmental cleaning, forms of
less indiscriminate culling, antivirals, and combinations. We explicitly compute the basic
Table 2. LPAI simulation model parameters, values, and references.
Parameter Value Reference
β1 1.5 [31]
β2 3 [31]
α 0.5 [33]
κ01, κ12, κ21 0.33 [31]
δ1 0.034 [31]
δ2 0.04 [31]
δV 0.5 [32]
e1, e2 10,000 [34]
ρ 0, 0.06, 0.2, 0.6, or 10,000 see description in text
φ 1 [34]
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0171199.t002
Table 3. Comparison of dynamics for varying levels of environmental transmission. The percentage of total infections caused by the environment is
determined by the value of ρ. Total deaths are determined at t = 30 days. In all three cases, all turkeys become infected. *The number of infections caused by
direct transmission is less than 0.001.
Percentage ρ Time of peak Infections at peak Total deaths
0 0 19 3,583 1,335
1/4 0.06 8.0 3,822 1,398
1/2 0.2 6.0 4,092 1,399
3/4 0.6 4.5 4,416 1,399
1* 10,000 2.9 4,716 1,400
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0171199.t003
Table 4. Comparison of dynamics for targeted rapid culling, varying the percent of culling. Only animals in the most infectious class I2 are culled. Cull-
ing occurs on day 4. One-half of infections are indirect (ρ = 0.2). Total deaths are determined at t = 30 days.
Percent Day of peak Infections at peak Total deaths Total culled Total lost
1 6.4 3,362 1,230 882 2,112
3/4 6.3 3,542 1,272 662 1,934
1/2 6.2 3,723 1,314 441 1,755
1/4 6.1 3,906 1,357 220 1,577
0 6.0 4,092 1,399 0 1,399
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0171199.t004
Table 5. Comparison of dynamics for targeted rapid culling, varying the day of culling. All infectious animals are culled (animals in I1A, I2, I1B). One-half
of infections are indirect (ρ = 0.2). Total deaths are determined at t = 30 days.
Day of cull Day of peak Infections at peak Total deaths Total culled Total lost
2 6.7 3,525 1,219 1,220 2,439
3 7.2 2,917 1,059 2,281 3,340
4 4.0 3,264 910 3,264 4,174
5 5.0 3,895 814 3,895 4,709
6 6.0 4,092 787 4,092 4,879
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0171199.t005
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reproduction number for each of the eradication methods and some combinations. Mathemat-
ical theory guarantees that if the basic reproduction number is less than one then the outbreak
will be driven to extinction.
Of course there are many simplifying assumptions behind this, and every, model, and
maybe more for mathematically tractable models. Sometimes simple models are more useful
than sophisticated models. We purposely designed our model to have a minimal number of
parameters besides vital titers, for use especially in the early phases of an outbreak where little
is known.
Although the nascent field of point-of-care instant molecular diagnostics is advancing at
lightening speed (see for example the GeneXpert Omni, by Cepheid (www.cepheid.com/us/
genexpert-omni, accessed 12/13/2016), at this time there appears to be a paucity of viral titer
structured data from transmission studies or outbreaks available in the literature. We thank a
referee for providing references [31] and [35]. With the improvement in rapid diagnostics, this
model and control strategies could be used in nearly realtime.
Based on [31], we simulate an LPAI outbreak in a mid-sized turkey farm. No control strat-
egy helped in any appreciable way and culling resulted in more total lost birds, significantly
more when all infectious birds are culled. Beside prediction, a major use of modeling is to gen-
erate hypotheses. We hope the quantitative predictions in this manuscript will stimulate fur-
ther research into the efficacy of culling to control outbreaks of infectious diseases in animal
populations.
Our simulations show these control methods will work best for diseases that move rela-
tively slowly through the animal populations, such as laryngotracheitis in poultry [21]. Avian
influenza control in intensive (large and dense) commercial flocks presents formidable chal-
lenges. Highly pathogenic strains move rapidly within a flock, with many birds appearing
sick or dying at the same time. For such outbreaks total depopulation (culling all birds) may
remain the best strategy to control the outbreak. Economically, total depopulation may also
be preferred, since poultry cannot be exported from an infected farm until the influenza is
completely absent from the farm.
These models assume mass action mixing of the susceptible and infected animals. This is
the usual null model in epidemiological models. The assumption of mass action mixing should
be reasonable for any population of free-roaming animals, or at least free-roaming for part of
the day, such as broiler, organic-pasture, or free-range chickens. The assumption may also be
applicable for some viral infections spread via aerosol transmission, even if the animals them-
selves are confined in cages, such as laying hens. In general, the risk of airborne transmission
varies dramatically in spatial and temporal proximity from infected animals [36].
A desirable consequence of the explicit formulas for the basic reproduction number is it
is straightforward to compute the sensitivities and elasticities for each (see [37] as a refer-
ence). For example, in the combination of unbiased rapid culling, vaccination, and antivi-
rals, the basic reproduction number has the same sensitivity with respect to culling and
vaccination.
The transmission models we present apply to a single geographic location (patch).
Modeling control strategies for FMD frequently involves multi-farm transport, possibly
of contaminated equipment, which we do not consider. Spatially explicit modeling, e.g.
including multiple locations and other spatial considerations, have been extensively studied
in [8, 11, 38–42]. Additional extensions, such as the addition of disease carriers, natural
births and deaths (for longer-term outbreaks), differential susceptibility by host species or
viral strain, and explicit consideration of the economic cost of implementing the control
strategies, can certainly be added to our basic model, and similar control strategies can be
studied.
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